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Abstract
In this paper, we assess the empirical relationship between population growth, mobility,
and state-level capital spending in the United States. To evaluate the magnitude of the
coecients, we introduce an explicit, quantitative political-economy model of government
spending determination, where mobility and population growth generate departures from
Ricardian equivalence. Our estimates nd strong responses in the level of capital provision
per capita to these demographic movements; in fact, the resulting coecients are stronger
than the model delivers. Regression coecients on population growth and mobility also
yield opposite implications for the direction to which spending is distorted by the political-
economy friction, posing a further challenge.
1 Introduction
The sharp recession recently experienced by the United States has highlighted once more the
plight of states whose nances are bound by constitutional restrictions on their indebtedness. The
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1magnitude of the shortfalls in many states' revenue projections and their anticipated expenses
calls into serious question their ability to balance their books without substantial help from the
federal government, which is not bound by similar rules. Throughout the recession, the federal
government has been able to borrow large resources from the capital markets.
While almost all states are in principle prevented from borrowing to cover their ordinary bud-
get, most of them routinely issue bonds to pay for capital improvements. This rule, commonly
known as \the golden rule," has long been rationalized with the fact that capital improvements
benet generations to come, who should be called to share the burden.1 Of course, such a ratio-
nale only holds in an economy that is far from Ricardian equivalence, for otherwise government
debt would have no eects on allocations and welfare (Barro [1]).
In this paper, we look at the evidence that state-level capital spending is driven by departures
from Ricardian equivalence stemming from mobility and population growth. We are certainly
not the rst ones to study this question; indeed, one of our goals is to supplement Poterba [10]
by considering additional and more recent data. However, our main objective is to interpret
the magnitudes of the coecients that we nd through the lens of an explicit political-economy
model that has sharp quantitative predictions about magnitudes of departure from Ricardian
equivalence. This turns out to be important; while the model is rejected by the data, this
happens because the response of capital provision to population growth and mobility is too
strong compared to the limited deviations that the model would expect.
Our starting point is a simple environment where the population is spread across dier-
ent states, and voters choose public spending year by year, taking into account the exogenous
prospects for mobility that they face and an exogenous path for the population growth in the
state they reside in.2 Voters discount future costs and benets of their policy choices more heav-
ily than eciency would dictate: this occurs because they neglect costs and benets that will
1See e.g. Studensky [15].
2By assuming that the evolution of population is exogenous, we abstract from the capitalization eects that
play a very important role in the literature on urban economics. A recent survey of this research is in Ross
and Yinger [12]. By looking at state-level data rather than local data, we expect capitalization to be much less
prevalent.
2accrue to future residents of the state that are not yet present. This eect will be larger, the
faster a state's population is growing or the more turnover among residents. In the absence of
any restriction on government indebtedness we would thus expect states to run large decits.
However, as mentioned above, a version of the \golden rule" prevents voters from nancing
non-capital expenses with debt. If strictly enforced, the golden rule fully restores incentives to
provide the correct amount of nondurable public goods: this is because both costs and benets
accrue immediately, and no long-term consequences emerge. However, in the case of public cap-
ital, both benets (of current investment) and costs (of current debt issuance) spill over into the
future. These costs and benets could align if debt issuance were structured so that the debt
was paid o at the same time as the benets accrued, but the two need not be aligned correctly.
In particular, whether costs or benets will be shifted further into the future depends on many
parameters of the model, but especially on the duration of capital, the maturity of debt, and the
fraction of debt nancing. The shorter the duration of capital, the longer the maturity of debt,
and the larger the fraction of debt nancing, the more costs are shifted to the future relative to
benets, to the point that voters might actually be induced to overspend.
The degree by which cost/benet mismatches lead to inecient spending depends on the
magnitude of departures from Ricardian equivalence. At one extreme, in a world of no mobility
and no population growth, the set of voters would be xed and the distribution of costs and
benets over time should be irrelevant. The model thus delivers quantitative predictions on how
mobility and population growth aect capital spending. It is these predictions that we take to
the data.
In our empirical exercise we document two main facts:
1. Capital spending by the states reacts to population growth much less than would be needed
to preserve a constant capital stock per capita. This implies that the capital stock per capita
declines with population growth.
2. For a given the population growth rate, capital spending is positively related to mobility,
i.e., it declines with the fraction of the population that remains in the state in any given
year.
3We nd that the magnitude of both eects is somewhat stronger than the model would be
able to predict, based on a plausible choice of parameters. Moreover, the two empirical facts
pose a greater challenge for the model when considered jointly. In the model, the inability of
public capital to keep up with population growth occurs when too little borrowing is allowed and
future benets exceed future costs: when this is the case, higher population growth leads to more
severe underinvestment, rationalizing the weak response of investment to the capital needs of a
growing population. In contrast, a positive relationship between mobility and capital spending
is interpreted by the model as evidence of too much borrowing: when future costs exceed the
benets, a more mobile population is more prone to overspending.
Section 2 presents the model through which we interpret the data. Section 3 provides further
intuition on the equilibrium relationship between government spending, population growth, and
mobility, and discusses ways in which this relationship can be informative about the parameters
of the model. Section 4 describes the data and provides a brief institutional overview. Our main
results are presented in section 5, while section 6 speculates on directions for future research.
2 Model
The model we adopt is based on Bassetto with Sargent [4]. However, we explicitly introduce here
the sources of variation across states and over time that will form the basis of our estimation
procedure. While highly stylized, the model we present provides an explicit account of the forces
that drive political decisions, and thus oers a transparent interpretation of the ndings of our
empirical exercise.
We consider N states (jurisdictions), each populated by a continuum of households. Each
state n is characterized by the following random variables:
 nst, the population growth in state s at time t.
 st, the probability that a household living in state s at t   1 is alive and in the same
state at t. For simplicity, we adopt the Blanchard [5] assumption that the probability of
dying (and of moving) is independent of age; time variation in mobility will thus aect all
4residents uniformly.3
 st, a measure of the household preference for public goods in the state;
We assume that all residents of a state share the same mobility and the same preferences
for (state-level) public goods.4 By assuming that these random variables depend on the state,
rather than the household, we make our analysis tractable, but our results would be robust to
the extent that endogenous mobility across states is limited.5







where cit is consumption of a private good by household i (residing in state s) and Gst is the
per-capita level of a state-level public good.6
Households discount the future at a rate ~ , where ~  is the mortality rate (assumed constant
across states for simplicity). We assume that the probability that a household that moves from
one state to another will move back is negligible. Because of this, households discount future
benets from the public goods and future taxes in the state in which they reside by st+1.
In each period, each person alive produces y units of output, which can be either consumed




Gst 1 + st; (2)
where  is the depreciation rate of the public good and st is public spending per capita in period
t in state s. In our empirical specications, we will consider several public goods, characterized
3As shown in Bassetto and Lepetyuk [3] (e.g., gure 1), variation by age is not as important, except for the
old that are far from being pivotal.
4Upon moving, each household thus inherits a new mobility and preference parameter, based on its new state
of residence.
5For evidence of limited mobility across states, see Meyer[9] and Gelbach [7]. A model of policy determination
with endogenous mobility is developed in Bassetto [2].
6We assume that public goods are subject to congestion externalities. Although this assumption does not
seem central to our results, we will study robustness in future versions.
7The private good is nondurable. Private capital could be introduced with no eect on the results, if income
taxes are restricted to labor; see Bassetto with Sargent [4].
5by dierent degrees of durability; in particular, we will constrast current expenditures (for which
we assume  = 1) to capital expenditures. The analysis developed here immediately generalizes
to multiple public goods by assuming that each good enters additively in the utility function.8
In particular, our key equation (9) will hold for each good independently.
Each state has a government that is empowered to levy income taxes and produce public
goods.9 Taxes and spending are chosen by majority vote each period by the residents of the
state,10 subject to two borrowing restrictions. The rst restriction limits to a value x the fraction
of public spending that can be nanced with debt. The constitutions of most U.S. states prevent
borrowing, except to nance capital expenditures; this would correspond to x = 0 for current
(nondurable) expenses, and x = 1 for capital projects. We will both study the implications of
setting x to these values and make inference on x from the data. The second restriction limits
the duration of debt. In the model, this is represented by a parameter , which represents
the minimal fraction of outstanding debt that must be bought back in any given period. This
parameter is a parsimonious representation of the limited duration of debt issued by U.S. states;
for some states, this limit is imposed by their constitution, while in other cases it might be
driven by other forces that are outside of the model, such as the lack of liquidity of maturities
longer than 30 years. The two borrowing restrictions give rise to the following constraints on
government behavior:
Bst = (1 + rt)
Bst 1
1 + nst
+ Gst   Tst (3)
and




where Bst is government debt per capita, rt is the real interest rate, and Tst are tax revenues per
capita.
We assume that households can annuitize their wealth, so the equilibrium interest rate of the
economy is the constant rt = (1   )=.







9Given that all residents of a state are identical and that location and income are exogenous, income taxes are
equivalent to xed lump-sum payments.
10Given our assumptions, all residents will share the same preferences, and the vote will be unanimous.
6Details of the denition and characterization of an equilibrium are provided by Bassetto with
Sargent [4]. As in that paper, we focus on Markov equilibria, where the equilibrium provision
of public capital is independent of the past.11 In these equilibria, households believe that any
additional investment in public goods beyond the equilibrium level would only last for one period,
and would be undone by the voters next period. This is an equilibrium because next-period voters
will indeed choose to undo any past investment that exceeds the equilibrium level, if they expect
future voters to do the same.
To determine the equilibrium level of spending, we analyze the decision faced by voters in
period t. Given the nature of the equilibrium, an increase in the time-t provision of the public
good will be reversed in the subsequent period; such a policy change would thus have eects
on public good provision for only for one period, but its tax implications would stretch into the
future. On the cost side, equations (3) and (4) imply that an additional unit of Gst increases
time-t taxes in state s by 1   x units. In period t + 1, the additional investment is undone by
reducing spending in the public good by (1 )=(1+nst+1) units. Period-t+1 taxes respond to
this investment reduction by 1   x, and they are also aected by the additional debt issued in









(1   x)(1   )
1 + nst+1
:
An additional unit of spending in period t has no further eects on public spending beyond












[   ](1   )
j 2; j > 1:
Whether taxes increase or decrease after period t + 1 depends on whether the public good
depreciates faster or slower than the rate at which government debt is paid back. When the
public good is not very durable and debt is paid back slowly, we have  >  and taxes increase
in the long run.
11Bassetto with Sargent does not include time variation in preferences and demographics. However, it is
straightforward to prove that, with quasilinear preferences, a Markov equilibrium of the same type exists even
when this time variation is introduced.
7To a current resident of the state at time t, the expected present value of taxes per unit of
public investment is the discounted sum of all these present and future tax changes:
Qst Et

































where Et is the conditional expectation taken with respect to the statewide shocks.
In voting, a resident will equate the marginal utility of the additional public good provision in




st = Qst =) logGst =
1

(logst   logQst) (6)
To simplify our expressions, we linearize logQst around nst = 0 and st = 1, and assume that
population growth and (one minus) the mobility rate follow AR(1) processes with autocorrela-
tions n and  and long-term means  n and  . This yields the following expression:
logQst  log(1   (1   )) +
(1   )
1   (1   )
(1 +  n       (st    ) + n(nst    n)) 
x

1 +  n    
1   (1   )
+
n(nst    n)(1   n(1   ))
(1   (1   ))(1   n(1   ))
 
(st    )(1   (1   ))




To derive intuition, we consider four components of equation (7) in turn:
1. log(1   (1   )). This is the only term that would apply if nst   n = 0 and st    = 1.
With no population growth and no mobility ever, this is a standard representative-agent
economy where Ricardian equivalence holds. Consequently, neither the fraction of debt
nancing x not debt maturity  have any eect on public good provision. Furthermore,




1 (1 )(1 +  n       (st    ) + n(nst    n)): This piece is the only relevant addition
when borrowing is ruled out (x = 0). In this case, higher mobility and/or population
12See Bassetto with Sargent [4] for the derivation of the ecient level.
8growth between period t and period t + 1 implies a higher eective discount factor by the
voters, and an accordingly lower level of government investment (provided depreciation is
less than full, i.e.,  < 1). Future expected population growth is driven by the long-term
mean  n and, given the highly persistent process, by the past realization nt. The reasoning




1 +  n    
1   (1   )

: (8)
This piece of the cost describes how debt nancing changes the cost perceived by the voters
when population growth and mobility are constant over time. In this case, higher popula-
tion growth (higher  n) and/or higher mobility (lower  ) increase eective discounting, and
imply that the perceived cost of a public project is lower. Mobility and population growth
thus interact with debt nancing to encourage government spending. For suciently high
values of x, this eect dominates the previous eect, and overspending can occur. This is
particularly likely if  is close to 0, i.e., when debt repayment occurs far into the future.
In practice, while population growth and mobility are not constant, they are very persistent.
It is straightforward to see that, as n ! 1 and  ! 1, the entire eect of debt on the
perceived cost of funding the public good is captured by equation (8), where  n is replaced
by nst and   is replaced by st. In this case, the intuition derived above for constant growth
and mobility still applies.
4. The remaining terms in equation (7) capture the way in which the speed of the repayment
schedule interacts with the demographic processes as nst and st converge (in expectation)
back to their long-run steady states. Given the high level of persistence of these processes,
they are not quantitatively important in driving voters' choices, except of course insofar as
they replace  n with nst and   with st in equation (8).
Based on the intuition developed above, the model predicts that the stock of public capital
will be lower in states with more population growth and/or higher mobility if no borrowing is
allowed. When enough borrowing of suciently long maturity is allowed, this relation reverses,
9and more population growth (mobility) is associated with higher capital. This is more likely to
















Fraction of debt financing x Fraction of stayers θ
Figure 1: Logarithm of public good provision with no pop. growth and constant mobility rate,
 = 0:03.
To gain further insight, in gures 1 and 2 we plot the log of the stock of the public good as a
function of the fraction of households that stay within the state from one year to the next (\the
stayers") and the degree to which debt nancing is allowed.13 In both gures we set  = 0:96,
 = 0:2, and  so that the half-life of debt is 15 years; we set population growth to 0 (to isolate
the eects of mobility), and we assume a constant mobility. Finally, we also normalize preferences
so that the ecient provision of the public good (in logs) is 0.
In gure 1 we set  = 0:03, which may be appropriate for major infrastructure investment,
whereas gure 2 adopts  = 0:06, in line with many estimates of the depreciation of private
capital. For each one of the gures, we set the preference shock st so that 0 corresponds to the
ecient level.
Not surprisingly, gures 1 and 2 show that Ricardian equivalence holds if there is no mobility



















Fraction of debt financing x Fraction of stayers θ
Figure 2: Logarithm of public good provision with no pop. growth and constant mobility rate,
 = 0:06.
( = 1), while spending departs more and more from the ecient level when the fraction of stayers
decreases. More interestingly, the sign of this departure depends on the circumstances. Under
a pure balanced budget (x = 0), we unambiguously obtain that public capital is underprovided.
However, under 100% debt nancing, when capital is not very durable ( = 0:06) costs are
shifted into the future to an extent that makes it worthwhile for voters to actually overprovide
public capital. In this case, increasing mobility (decreasing the fraction of stayers) increases
the provision of public capital. The main implication of the model is that, for high degrees of
debt nancing, we should observe a positive relationship between the level of public capital and
mobility for capital goods subject to rapid depreciation, and a negative relationship for very
long-term projects.
In gure 3 we show that the basic intuition is unchanged when time-varying mobility and
population growth are introduced. This gure picks the same depreciation rate as gure 2
( = 0:06) and holds all parameters the same, except population growth is set at the long-
















Fraction of debt financing x Fraction of stayers θ
st
Figure 3: Logarithm of public good provision,  = 0:06, with population growth and mean
reversion in the mobility rate.
 are also set at their respective estimates. Because of positive population growth, Ricardian
equivalence no longer holds even when there is no mobility across states, but this eect is small.
The discussion above refers to the stock of public capital. In the data, we actually observe the
ows of public investment (and expenses in nondurable goods). In the model, this is captured









logst   (1   )logst 1    log(1   (1   )) 
(1   )
1   (1   )
(1 +  n       (st    ) + n(nst    n))+
x

1 +  n    
1   (1   )
+
n(nst    n)(1   n(1   ))
(1   (1   ))(1   n(1   ))
 
(st    )(1   (1   ))




1   (1   )
(n(nst   nst 1)   (st   st 1))+
x(1   )

n(nst   nst 1)(1   n(1   ))
(1   (1   ))(1   n(1   ))
 
(st   st 1)(1   (1   ))




For high values of n and , public investment behaves very similarly to the stock of public
capital; in particular, the relationship between mobility and investment is very similar to that
between mobility and the stock of public capital. One important exception is the additional term
(1   )nst=, which aects the relationship between investment and population growth. This
term captures the need to provide infrastructure for the additional population, and introduces
an additional reason why we should expect higher public investment in faster-growing states.14
3 Empirical Strategy and Identication
Equation (9) forms the basis of our empirical strategy. We will estimate the following regression:
logst = a + b1nst + b2(nst   nst 1) + b3st + b4(st   st 1) + st: (10)
In practice, the high degree of persistence and the diculty in matching the timing of political
choice and demographic movements imply that the estimates of b2 and b4 will be unreliable,
while estimates of b1 and b3 will be robust to slight mismatches in the timing of events. Because
of this, we will focus our discussion on estimates of b1 and b3.
14It is worth stressing that this result does not rely on our assumption about congestion. With no congestion
newcomers would not need any additional infrastructure, but the resulting increasing returns would make it
desirable to expand the stock of public capital per capita when population is higher.
13Our identifying restriction is that the preference shock in (9) is uncorrelated with population
growth and mobility. In our preferred regression, we introduce several controls that are meant
to capture elements of the preference shock that may be correlated with demographics.
To assess the success and the shortcomings of the model in explaining the data, we proceed in
two steps. First, we completely parameterize the model imposing plausible values into equation
(9), and we study the dimensions in which the results diverge from the data. These parameter
values are summarized in table 1. Second, we give the model one degree of freedom and use
estimates of b1 and b3 to infer the amount of debt nancing allowed at the margin (x), while
holding all other parameters at their calibrated values. This gives us an alternative measure of
the aspects of the data that the model is able to capture, and those that it misses.
Parameter Assigned Value Comment
 0.96
 0.06
 1   2 1=15 Half-life of debt: 15 years
n 0.897 Estimate from data
 0.973 Estimate from data (annualized)
 0.2 Lower range of estimates surveyed by DelRossi and Inman [6]
x 1 100% debt nancing allowed for capital projects
Table 1: Baseline calibration
To gain further intuition, consider what would happen if public investment were always at
its ecient level in all states. In this case, the model would deliver b3 = 0 and b1 = (1   )=:
mobility should have no eect, while public investment should react positively to population
growth by an amount that matches exactly what is needed to keep the same stock of capital per
resident.
When b3 is dierent from zero, we can infer from its sign whether mobility is a force that
generates underprovision or overprovision of public capital in the model. Specically, if b3 > 0,
more mobility (a lower st) lowers public investment. In this case, mobility is a force that leans
to underprovision. The opposite intuition applies when b3 < 0.
In the case of b1, we can infer whether population growth is a force that leads to under{ or
overprovision by looking at the sign of b1 (1 )=. When b1 < (>)(1 )=, higher population
14growth is not matched (more than matched) by adequate public investment, so population growth
is a force leading to underprovision (overprovision).












Fraction of debt financing x
Figure 4: Coecient b1 as a function of x, for four values of : 1/60,1/5,1,5 (atter lines represent
higher ).
Figures 4 and 5 adopt our baseline calibration and show how the coecients b1 and b3 are
aected by x, for various values of . Within each graph, the four lines correspond to dierent
price elasticities of the demand for public goods: the higher is the elasticity (lower ), the more
responsive are the coecients to changes in x. In both graphs, there is a value of x that delivers
the neutral value ((1 )= for b1 and 0 for b3), independently of . For values below this critical
threshold, borrowing is not sucient to restore proper incentives, and underprovision ensues; we
then obtain b1 < (1   )= and b3 > 0. Above the threshold, enough costs are shifted into the
future that more mobility (population growth) makes voters choose higher capital spending.
Using equation (9), simple algebra shows that the value of x such that b1 = 0 and that
which delivers b3 = (1   )= will be dierent, unless n = . This can be seen in the pictures,
where the critical threshold is above 80% for population growth and below for mobility. In the












Fraction of debt financing x
Figure 5: Coecient b3 as a function of x, for four values of : 1/60,1/5,1,2 (atter lines represent
higher ).
range between the two critical thresholds, we cannot establish whether public capital is under{
or overprovided: greater population growth leads towards underprovision, but greater mobility
goes in the opposite direction. In practice, given the high autocorrelation of both processes, the
critical thresholds are very close to each other, and it is implausible for x to fall in this narrow
range.
4 Data and Institutional Features of the States
The assumptions in the model correspond to many of the basic features of state government
nance in the United States. Nearly all states operate under the strictures of balanced budget
requirements. These require that at some point in the budgeting process, current expenditures
are expected to be paid for out of current revenues. States dier in when in the budget process
balance must be obtained. As a result, these can dier in how binding they are in practice.
For example, the Illinois constitution states, \The Governor shall prepare and submit to the
16General Assembly... a State budget for the ensuing scal year....Proposed expenditures shall not
exceed funds estimated to be available for the scal year as shown in the budget." In Illinois, the
legislature is also required to pass a balanced budget. However, if circumstances change within
the scal year, the state can borrow to cover unexpected decits.
Borrowing for capital expenditures lays outside these balanced budget requirements and sep-
arate provisions cover state ability to issue debt for capital projects. In Illinois, for example,
the state can issue debt provided that it is for a specic purpose and is approved by 3/5 of the
legislature or by a majority of voters in a referendum. Nearly all states also have capital budgets
that specically detail how capital projects are to be nanced.
For most municipal bonds, the state issues debt of a certain duration, gets the money up front,
spends the money within 2-5 years of issuance, pays interest over time (usually semi-annually)
and then pays the entire principal back when the bond matures. Most municipal bonds are
callable and most states allow bonds to be called and refunded provided that the duration is
not extended. Municipal bonds tend to be of fairly long duration. In October 2009, the average
maturity of municipal bonds was 16.9 years, while the average maturity of corporate bonds was
13.5 years.15 Also in contrast to corporate bonds, one municipal bonds issuance often contains
several maturities (these are called serial maturities). In addition, there are often sinking funds
associated with non-serial bonds where the issuer makes several payments into a sinking fund so
that the entire principal does not need to be funded at one point.
In order to estimate our model, our rst need is to measure st for current and capital spend-
ing. For this purpose, we use data from the Annual Survey of State Government Finances.
This data has been collected for all states by the Census Bureau since 1915 with the omission
of some years in the 20s and 30s. Since 1952, the survey has followed a fairly consistent for-
mat. The data are available in electronic format for (Fiscal Years) 1972 and from 1977-2007
and contain detailed information on government expenditures, revenues, and debt. These state
government nances data are extremely detailed and data are reported for over 400 categories for
each state. For example, expenditures are divided into 64 dierent government functions, such
15See [13, 14].
17as Air Transportation, Corrections, and Elementary and Secondary Education. For each func-
tion, expenditure data is available for numerous dierent purposes such as capital expenditures,
current expenditures and intergovernmental expenditure.
In this paper we are concerned with patterns of current and capital expenditures. According
to the survey's classication manual, current expenditures include expenditures for employee
compensation, supplies and materials. By contrast, capital outlay includes \expenditure for the
purchase or construction, by contract or government employee, construction of buildings and
other improvements; for purchase of land, equipment, and existing structures; and for payments
on capital leases.16" In the data, capital outlay is further divided into construction, purchase of
land and existing structures, and purchase of equipment.
We supplement this with data on state population growth and state mobility. State pop-
ulation data is available annually from the Census Bureau. It is straightforward to calculate
population growth rates, nst and annual changes in these population growth rates, nst   nst 1
from this data. The measure of mobility delineated in the theory is the probability that a house-
hold living in state s at t is alive and in the same state at t + 1. As mentioned earlier, we
extrapolate away from the death by assuming a constant hazard of death. Data on state migra-
tion ows are available in the Decennial Census. In the Census individuals are asked whether
they changed residences in the past ve years and if so where they lived ve years prior. We
dene a state's mobility as the number of people who lived in the state ve years ago who live
in a dierent state in the Census year, divided by the number of people from the state ve years
prior who still live in the US. We linearly interpolate between Census Years and use regression
analysis to predict migration ows since the last decennial Census.17 Because these are ve-year
migration ows and we are interested in annual migration, we divide the resulting rates by ve.
The percent of the population living in the same state is then one minus the percent of the
population who had moved. We label these individuals \stayers".
16See [16], chapter 5.
17For extrapolation only, state migration rates are predicted based on state dummies, state specic time trends,
state population, median income, state poverty rates, percent over 65, percent under 25, percent urban, home-
ownership rate, percent with a high-school diploma, and percent with a bachelor's degree.
18We can only consistently estimate b1, b2, b3, and b4 if the preference shock captured in st
is orthogonal to population growth and immobility. As a result, we include in the regression
features of states that we believe are correlated with spending and are also correlated with
either mobility or population growth. In particular we are concerned with proxying for state
resident preferences for scal variables that may also be related to population growth or mobility.
We choose several population attributes { average personal income, median household income,
percent of the population with a high-school diploma, percent urban, population density, percent
over 65, percent under 25, home ownership rate, population liberalism, and resident taste for
mobility. Most of these variables are available annually or by decade from the Census Bureau.
We interpolate between Census years for data that is available less frequently. Two measures
merit further discussion { population liberalism and resident taste for mobility. For population
liberalism, we use factor analysis; specically, we take the rst factor from ve state political
variables { the percent of the popular vote for the Democratic Presidential candidate in the
previous election, the percent of the state's Senate delegation that belongs to the Democratic
Party, the percent of the state's House delegation that belongs to the Democratic party, the
average Americans for Democratic Action (ADA; a liberal political organization) score for the
state's Senate delegation, and the average ADA score for the state's House delegation. The
resident taste for mobility is measured as the number of people that moved to a new house in
state in the ve years leading up to the Census divided by the number of people that stayed in
state. We add this proxy for preferences for mobility because we believe that many unobsevable
attributes of populations that would inuence interstate mobility would inuence within-state
mobility in a similar manner.
Variable means for these variables are presented in Table 2 for the 48 contiguous United
States. Alaska and Hawaii are omitted from the analysis.18 We can see from this table that
states vary substantially in per capita scal variables. We also note that state current spending
is about 8 times the level of state capital spending on average. Most capital spending is for
construction while smaller amounts are dedicated to land and equipment expenditure.
18The inclusion of Alaska would alter the means and results due to unusual capital spending patterns in the
state.
19Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Per Capita Capital Spending (2007 $) 1440 314.107 128.570
Per Capita Spending on Land and Existing Structures (2007 $) 1440 16.548 16.211
Per Capita Spending on Equipment (2007 $) 1440 42.619 19.971
Per Capita Construction Spending (2007 $) 1440 254.941 115.580
Per Capita Current Spending (2007 $) 1440 2443.777 686.4024
Stayers (Fraction of Residents Remaining in State, 1-year horizon) 1440 0.979 0.00609
Fraction of Stayers Changing House within State (5-year horizon) 1440 0.380 0.0406
State Personal Income Per Capita (000 of 2007 $) 1440 28.274 6.596
Median Household Income (000 of 2007 $) 1440 43.762 7.615
Fraction with a High School Degree 1440 0.782 0.0904
Fraction Urban 1440 0.695 0.147
Population Density 1440 0.148 0.189
Fraction Over 65 1440 0.124 0.0181
Fraction Under 25 1440 0.373 0.0358
Democratic Leanings of State 1440 -0.00833 0.943
Homeownership Rate 1440 0.680 0.0507
Table 2: Sample Moments
5 Results
In Table 3, we present regressions predicting the natural log of per capita scal variables based
on population growth, mobility, their rst dierences, and the preference parameters.19 We also
include year dummies to capture nationwide trends in spending. We cluster the standard errors
by state. We are particularly concerned with predictions of capital spending (in column 1) and
current expenditures (in column 5). Following the variable labels, we note those variables that
directly map into variables in our equations. In addition to capital and current spending we
estimate the determinants of subcategories of capital spending.
In the regression on capital spending, we note that states with more permanent resident
populations (more stayers), have signicantly lower capital expenditures. A one standard devi-
ation increase in the fraction of stayers (.006) decreases log per capita capital expenditure by
19In the case of purchases of land and existing structures we lose two state-year observations due to zeros.
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Pop. growth (nt) 3.412 18.25*** 6.120** 1.250 0.285
(2.287) (6.625) (2.730) (2.603) (1.635)
Pop. growth -3.634** -15.53** -3.792* -2.530 -0.251
change (nt   nt 1) (1.409) (5.924) (2.145) (1.550) (1.110)
Fraction of -33.49*** 21.76* -17.77*** -38.88*** -7.007**
stayers (t) (5.172) (12.89) (4.732) (5.652) (3.245)
Change in frac. -10.44 -16.93 9.982 -15.95 4.967
stayers (t   t 1) (25.42) (62.46) (37.14) (24.72) (17.21)
Internal -1.606 2.748 -2.379 -1.450 -2.757***
migration (1.188) (2.975) (1.831) (1.095) (0.725)
Average pers. 0.0283*** 0.00457 0.0314* 0.0283*** -0.00157
income (0.00858) (0.0311) (0.0165) (0.00838) (0.00831)
Median -0.0139** -0.0146 -0.00800 -0.0142** -0.00153
income (0.00631) (0.0190) (0.0104) (0.00665) (0.00340)
Frac HS -0.217 1.409 0.103 -0.370 0.986***
diploma (0.622) (1.689) (0.665) (0.708) (0.342)
Frac urban -0.435 -0.619 -0.638 -0.406 -0.413*
(0.327) (0.809) (0.390) (0.332) (0.234)
Pop. dens. 0.316 1.892*** 0.0327 0.316 0.253
(0.200) (0.685) (0.303) (0.202) (0.204)
Fraction 0.288 -0.0529 1.390 -0.0803 2.843**
over 65 (1.985) (5.583) (2.073) (2.271) (1.340)
Fraction 3.588** 0.554 6.455*** 3.355** -0.0248
under 25 (1.453) (3.638) (1.708) (1.587) (0.930)
Liberal 0.0218 -0.125 0.00982 0.0298 0.0628***
index (0.0307) (0.0779) (0.0355) (0.0329) (0.0143)
Fraction 0.265 0.962 0.272 0.246 -0.464
homeowners (0.722) (1.653) (1.044) (0.686) (0.462)
Constant 37.30*** -21.21 18.22*** 42.59*** 15.96***
(5.117) (13.20) (4.208) (5.733) (3.265)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1440 1438 1440 1440 1440
R-sq. 0.575 0.119 0.472 0.549 0.740
Table 3: Regression results. Each column corresponds to a dierent dependent variable. All
dependent variables are in logs of their per capita value. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, *p < 0:1.
21Figure 6:
-0.2, or about half a standard deviation. In gure 6, we display the relationship between per
capita capital spending and stayers for 1985. Even with no controls, a clear negative pattern
emerges, which is robust to excluding outliers such as Wyoming. As shown in table 3, column 2,
this relation reverses in the case of purchases of land and existing structures, arguably the most
durable component of spending.
The relationship between spending and population growth is far weaker; it is always posi-
tive, but not statistically signicant for overall capital spending and for the large category of
construction.20 Figure 7 shows the 1985 snapshot with no controls: unlike the case of movers,
20In Poterba [10], the relationship is negative. However, both in our paper and his, these coecients are mostly
not signicantly away from zero, so a dierent sign is not indicative of a large discrepancy. In future versions, we
plan to study in more details the dierences between our results and Poterba's. Three main dierences stand out
in our methodology: rst, our analysis considers a long range of years, while he looks at a single year; second, we
include highway spending, which is heavily aected by federal transfers and might thus behave dierently; and
22no clear pattern emerges, except for the outlier Wyoming, whose population contracted in that
year.
Figure 7:
Most of the variables measuring preference shocks are statistically insignicant in the capital
spending regression. There are two exceptions { the income variables and the percent of the
population under 25. For the income variables, the positive personal income eect dominates
the median income eect and we nd that states with richer populations spend more on capital
goods. We also nd that states with younger populations spend more on capital projects. This
may be explained by the large role of states in the purchase and construction of school buildings.
In column 5 we look at the determinants of current spending. Here we also nd that having
a more stable population decreases expenditures. However, the magnitude of the eect is much
smaller. Here a one standard deviation increase in stayers (.006) decreases log current per
third, we regress logs of spending per capita rather than levels, to be consistent with our model.
23capita expenditure by -0.04, or about one seventh of a standard deviation. Our model could be
consistent with this relationship if all the benets of current spending occur in the current period,
while some of it is nanced by debt. On the other hand, this relationship may be an indication
that we have not adequately captured some attributes of state population that both decrease
mobility and tastes for current expenditures. A number of other population attributes also
have statistically signicant eects on current per capita expenditure. States with high internal
mobility also have lower current spending. This may be because individuals who move within the
state may be less tied into government services. We also nd that states with a high proportion
of individuals with a high-school diploma have higher current expenditures. In addition we nd
states with a higher percent urban have lower levels of current expenditure. This may be due
to the role of municipalities in the provision of public services in urban areas. This conjecture
is supported by the fact that this relationship goes away if we look at the determinants of state
and local spending combined. We also nd that more liberal states have higher levels of current
expenditures.
To see how the results in table 3 square with the model, table 4 compares the coecients
of interest to those predicted by the model. For general capital, we use the baseline calibration
of table 1; for its subcategories, we use dierent values of :  = 0:02 for puchases of land and
existing structures,  = 0:12 for equipment, and  = 0:03 for construction. In the case of current
expenses, we set  = 1 (full depreciation), and x = 0 (no borrowing allowed).
Consider rst the case of total capital expenditures (column 1). At rst glance, it may seem
surprising that both the model and the data point to a negative relationship between these
expenditures and the fraction of stayers. However, as we noted in section 3, this result emerges
when capital is nanced mostly through long-term borrowing. As is noted in Inman [8] and
Poterba [10], states with high mobility can use debt issuance to transfer the funding of capital
projects to future residents and therefore may demand more spending. While current residents
get some of the benets of the capital spending now, future residents pay. We also previously
established that a negative relationship between stayers and spending is less likely for capital
expenses that are very long-lasting. This can be viewed in the other columns. Our calibrated
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Coecient on the fraction of stayers:
Regression (data) -33.49*** 21.76* -17.77*** -38.88*** -7.007**
(5.172) (12.89) (4.732) (5.652) (3.245)
Calibration (model) -13.44 18.64 -31.80 7.26 0
Coecient on population growth:
Regression (data) 3.412 18.25*** 6.120** 1.250 0.285
(2.287) (6.625) (2.730) (2.603) (1.635)
Calibration (model) 23.44 44.27 22.27 32.04 0
Needed to keep 15.67 49 7.33 32.33 0
per-capita level
Table 4: Comparison of coecients of interest in the regression with their predicted values
according to the calibrated model.
model predicts an even stronger negative relationship between investment and stayers in the case
of equipment, while it predicts a strong positive relationship with land and a very weak one in
the case of construction. Qualitatively, the data t with the model, with the important exception
of construction, where the model and the data are completely at odds. However, quantitatively
large discrepancies emerge. In particular, for the case of total capital expenditures, the data
suggest a much stronger response to the fraction of stayers compared to the one that the model
can justify. We could get a somewhat better t by increasing the price elasticity of the demand
for public goods, but by choosing  = 0:2 (a value at the low end of the spectrum of estimates)
we already gave the model some leeway in this dimension.
Table 4 shows even bigger discrepancies between the calibrated model and the data in the
case of population growth. For all categories of investment, the regression coecients are below
what would be needed to maintain a constant per-capita provision of capital; in most cases, the
regression coecients are far below this level. In contrast, the model would predict values even
higher than the replacement value for total capital: since 100% debt nancing is associated with
overinvestment in the model, higher population growth induces bigger departures from Ricardian
25equivalence and thus bigger overspending. Even for the categories in which underspending is
predicted, the model would expect coecients close to those needed to keep a constant per-
capita prole. Our regression suggests one of three possible explanations:
1. States have been unable to keep up capital provision for a growing population in the last
30 years;
2. Congestion is much more limited than we assume, so there is less need for additional capital
for the growing population; furthermore, states do not exploit these increasing returns to
increase the per-capita provision as we would expect from Samuelson's rule;
3. Population growth and preferences for capital spending are correlated; specically, the
population of fast-growing states tends to have preferences skewed for small government.21
However, no evidence of this small-government bias appears for current expenses, for which
we obtain the predicted coecient of 0.
The previous analysis imposed extremely tight constraints on the ability of the model to t
the data, since no parameter was allowed to vary based on our empirical ndings. We next
give the model one degree of freedom by inferring values of x from our regression results, while
keeping all other parameters xed. Specically, we look for the values of x that can match the
regression coecients to those implied by the model. We do so independently for the coecients
on population growth and the fraction of stayers. In order to identify x, we need measures of n
and . For population growth, our estimate from the data yields:
nst = 0:000961 + 0:897 nst 1 +error term
(0:00017) (0:0111)
For mobility, we rely on data from the decennial census, which asks respondents to report their
state of residence 5 years prior. We estimate the 10-year persistence in the fraction of 5-year
21In the case of counties, Rappaport [11] argues that there is evidence that movers tend to favor smaller-
government areas, leading to growth in those areas.
26stayers. This yields:
5(1   st) = 0:0206 + 0:760 5(1   st 10) +error term
(0:0043) (0:0356)
The implied 1-year autocorrelation  is 0.973.
Table 5 presents the values of x that reconcile the regression coecients with the model,
along with the standard deviation computed using the delta method.22
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




x needed to match coecient on the fraction of stayers:
1.337 0.949 0.762 1.766 0.121
(0.0982) (0.226) (0.108) (0.11) (0.0605)
x needed to match coecient on population growth:
0.593 0.609 0.590 0.49 0.011
(0.0468) (0.221) (0.192) (0.16) (0.0663)
Table 5: Indirect estimates of the fraction of debt nancing.
If we look at the inferred values for x needed to match each coecient in isolation, it would
seem that the model could be reconciled with the data with just some slight stretches (except
for construction, where implied values of x are far from the reasonable range). In the case
of population growth, all of the implied values for x are well below 1: as we already know,
the regression coecients on population growth would suggest underprovision of public capital,
which in the model only occurs if debt nancing is markedly lower than 100%. In the case of
mobility, the regression coecients imply overprovision of the public good, which the model can
reconcile if x takes a much higher value, even above 1 in some cases.
The main challenge arising from table 5 is that it is impossible to reconcile the regression
coecients on population growth and mobility at the same time. The model implies a very tight
22In computing the standard deviation, we take into account the uncertainty about the autocorrelation param-
eters. We assume independence of the errors across regression equations.
27connection between the eects of population growth and the fraction of stayers on the provision
of the public good, and this connection is clearly rejected by the data. The t of the model
might be improved if with some more freedom of moving other parameters, but this would be
unlikely to address the main diculty: that the regression coecients on population growth and
the fraction of stayers have opposite implications within the context of the model.23
Table 5 also contains estimates for the degree of debt nancing of current expenses. These
estimates show that our results for current expenses are consistent with the ability by states
to borrow for a small fraction of these expenses. This is in line with the informal evidence
that states have a little room for \creative accounting" before the restrictions of the balanced-
budget requirement kick in. Although we reject the hypothesis that the implied values of x from
population growth and mobility are the same (the P-value is about 4.5%), column (5) is much
closer to the theoretical results than the others.
6 Conclusion
In this preliminary draft, we have studied the relationship between population growth, mobility,
and capital and current spending at the state level in the United States. To interpret our
empirical results, we considered a full-edged political-economy model, where the provision of
public goods is endogenously derived from the underlying demographic primitives.
When interpreted by the model, our regression coecients behave schizophrenically: the
eect of population growth points to the range of underprovision of public capital, whereas the
response to increased mobility points to the opposite range of overprovision.
A maintained assumption in our analysis is that preferences for public goods are not system-
atically related to mobility and population growth at the state level, except through the variables
23If we let  vary as well as x, it would be possible to reconcile the coecients b1 and b3 in the regression
with the model, by picking values of x in the narrow range in which population growth and mobility work in
opposite directions and blowing up the magnitude of the eect through a very low estimate of . However, this
would require values of the price elasticity of the demand for public goods that are much higher than anything
reasonable.
28for which we directly controlled. A rst step in reconciling data and theory is to look further
into the determinants of mobility and population growth.
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